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Lorna Hutson
Theaters of Intention has the makings of a major book. Its far-
reaching claims about the relationship between law and theater in
early modern England are both intricately argued and meticulously
substantiated. It is a demanding book, too; partly, of course, because
of the often-attested resistance of common-law terminology to being
translated into layman's terms, but also, I think, because, as Wilson
points out, "discussions of intention" themselves must derive from "a
range of disciplinary contexts."' The book proposes that what the
institutions of law and theater primarily share in early modern Eng-
land is a preoccupation with the problems of representing human
action as intentional. Neither the discipline of literary criticism, nor
that of legal history, however, has ever exactly theorized intention as
a problem relating to the representation of action in this way. So the
book's complexity arises from the fact that the relationship of
similarity and difference between early modern legal and theatrical
investments in representing intentional action can only be explored
by using the analytical tools of a range of disciplines: literary criti-
cism, poststructuralist literary theory, theater studies, legal history,
sociology, anthropology, philosophy of language, and the history of
classical rhetoric, to name just a few.
The idea that both the law and the theater might have an interest,
in a certain historical moment, in representing human action as in-
tentional is powerfully innovative in itself. It forces one to think of
intention not as necessarily antecedent to and causative of human
action, but as a problem. The idea runs against our common sense
1. LUKE WILSON, THEATERS OF INTENTION: DRAMA AND LAW IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND 7 (2000).
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ways of talking both about dramatic fiction and about legal liability.
In the case of drama, especially Shakespearean drama, the remark-
able post-Bradleyan and post-poststructuralist tenacity of character
criticism attests to our investment in ascribing intentions to the a-
gents of dramatic plot, rather than seeing their actions as rhetorically
instrumental within the fiction (New Historicism, seeing characters
as cultural symptoms rather than poetic achievements, hardly chal-
lenges this kind of common sense). Similarly, our tendency to think
of homicide cases as mysteries on the models of Agatha Christie and
Inspector Morse urges us to organize our ideas about evidence,
proof, and legal liability around a reconstruction of motives and
intentions-the revelation of the guilty mind that planned it all. In
both instances it is assumed that actions-sometimes only retrospec-
tively signified (by corpses, murder weapons, ghosts)-have agents,
and that agents have intentions. So what does it mean to talk about
the representation of intentional action as a problem for legal prac-
tice and dramatic composition in the sixteenth century?
Well, for one thing, such an approach forces us to discard the usual
logic of cause and effect-the idea that actions derive from inten-
tions. Instead, we must replace it with an appreciation of the work
done by intention as a retrospective fiction that makes sense of ac-
tion, or as a way of allocating liability, of connecting action with an
agent. Even putting the idea this way makes it obvious how close the
connection must be between legal discourse and literary composi-
tion. In sixteenth-century common law, Wilson shows, it became
necessary to ascribe intention in order to prove guilt (in the case of
homicide), or (in the case of "assumpsit") in order to ascertain the
existence of the implied promise on which any legal action must
depend. At the same time, theater was moving from the syllogistic
structure of the morality play, and from the ritualistic actor-audience
relationship embodied in the clown, towards the illusory mimesis of
Shakespearean drama. The mimetic structure of Shakespearean
drama is based, as Joel Altman and others have argued, on rhetorical
hypothesis, and so involves the elaboration of the circumstances of a
particular story, rather than the morality play's proof of a general
thesis.2 Shakespearean drama therefore requires that the audience be
persuaded that the characters (no longer either allegorical personifi-
cations of morality drama or descendants of the fool of ancient
ritual) harbor intentions, and thence that the dramatic action can be
made sense of in terms of a reconstruction of those intentions, a
working out of what each speaker and agent "meant" by saying or
2. See JOEL ALTMAN, THE TUDOR PLAY OF MIND: RHETORICAL INQUIRY AND THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF ELIZABETHAN DRAMA (1978).
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doing a certain thing. A sixteenth-century legal concern with the way
fictions of intention allocate liability, therefore, might intersect with
the concern of an emergent professional drama to create plots that
engage the audience in the belief that the dramatis personae are
more than transparent agents of authorial intention. I have to say
that Wilson does not state the law/theater relationship in quite these
terms; I am inferring it from the argument that his book conducts
largely at the level of detailed correspondences between specific
cases and textual cruxes in plays.
Wilson begins with an exploration of the ways in which intention is
conceptualized in Hamlet and in contemporary legal discourse con-
cerning homicide. Critics have long been aware of the presence of
legal language in the gravediggers' ludicrous discussion of Ophelia's
suicide in Act 5, which garbles Plowden's report of the argument for
the defence in the famous case of Hales v. Pedtt This case was
brought by Margaret Hales, widow of Sir James Hales, a justice of
the Court of Common Pleas, who had committed suicide in 1554 by
drowning. Margaret Hales's case was that she should not have had
to forfeit her late husband's lands on the grounds that his suicide was
felonious, because the felony could only be adjudged as such after
his death, whereas her possession antedated that judgment. Petit's
lawyers, however, won the case by arguing that the forfeiture must
have occurred in Hales's lifetime. They thus derived the act's feloni-
ous quality from Hales's imputed intention to destroy himself. By
way of this case and other fascinating cases, Wilson demonstrates the
tendency of intentions to become "modular" and "detachable" in
legal parlance. Legal thinking of this kind enters Hamlet, Wilson ar-
gues, at those moments when Hamlet appears to act spontaneously,
and then to conceive intentions, or explanatory accounts, after the
act. Wilson does not quite sum up the implications of this argument,
but it is undeniably provocative and suggestive.
The sixteenth-century law of contract, no less than that of homi-
cide, was, in Wilson's words, enabling a new "sophistication of legal
conceptualizations of intention."4 Wilson's second to sixth chapters
argue that there is a link between newly sophisticated concepts of
dramatic temporality and a new awareness-evident in the triumph
of the action of "assumpsit" over the ancient common law writ of
debt-of the duration between the promise and its fulfillment (or
non-fulfillment) as a legally accountable interval. These linked devel-
opments are further connected to the idea of the emergence of a
subjective sense of self or of "interiority" as that which fills the con-
3. 75 Eng. Rep. 387 (K.B. 1562).
4. WILSON, supra note 1, at 43.
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tractual interval-a retrospective or implied narrative of states of
intention. Wilson discusses the triumph of "assumpsit" over debt,
enshrined in the outcome of Slade's Case in 1602,' in terms of its
effects on the way in which people thought about what he calls the
"temporal shape" of their actions. He understands the old common
law action of debt as essentially "atemporal," whereas the action of
"assumpsit" (being brought on the promise implied by a debt, rather
than the debt itself) retrospectively generates a narrative of the
defendant's and plaintiff's interior states, a narrative of "intentions,
deceits, motives and considerations."6 The triumph of "assumpsit"
thus, Wilson claims, produced
the shift from a customary culture in which social actors operate
in habitual ways without formulating accounts of their inten-
tions and reasons for acting, to an assumpsit or contract culture
in which ... social actors are forced to assume a habit of con-
stant self-examination, attending to their own consciousness and
continually constructing intentional accounts of their actions.7
The argument then goes on, in a range of ways, to link the tem-
porality of dramatic performance, producing the illusion of charac-
terological coherence, with that of the contractual interval that now,
apparently, stretches out or extends between all forms of collab-
orative action, and invades all kinds of relationship. In Chapter Four,
Promissory Performances, Wilson considers the implications of the
way in which the theatrical sense of the verb "to perform" emerges
from its earlier sense of being transitively linked to a promise. In
Chapter Five, Contracting Damnation, developments in the law
relating to witchcraft are intriguingly demonstrated to have absorbed
the new thinking on "assumpsit" and contract, raising questions
about the apportioning of agency in transactions with the devil and
offering a new perspective on Marlowe's Dr. Faustus.' There are
illuminating moments, too, in Wilson's discussion of contract and
agency in Bartholomew Fair,9 I was struck by the rightness of the
observation that the coney-catching tricks of Jonson's fair are all
constructed as contractual agreements involving exchange. A final
chapter on the iconography of "Nemo" or "Nobody" in popular and
Northern humanist culture (though disappointingly not forthcoming
5. Slade v. Morely, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1602).
6. WILSON, supra note 1, at 80.
7. Id. at 78.
8. CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE, THE TRAGICAL HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND DEATH OF
DOCTOR FAUSTUS (1594).
9. BEN JONSON, BARTHOLOMEW FAIR (1614).
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about Ulrich Von Hutten's contribution to this tradition"°) considers
the figure in relation to ideas of agentless action and characterolog-
ical coherence developed in earlier chapters.
Finally, however, I was not entirely persuaded by the overarching
thesis that a relationship exists between a Shakespearean and Jon-
sonian sense of the temporality of dramatic performance and a post-
Slade 's Case sense of interiority as contractual. I detect a problem
with Wilson's assumption that, because the common law of debt did
not rely upon the idea of a promise, implicit or spoken, it must fol-
low that people prior to the triumph of assumpsit did not have soph-
isticated ideas about contractual duration. Studies of exchange in
pre-capitalist societies, such as Paul Millet's Lending and Borrowing
in Ancient Athens (1991), have shown that the credit system secured
by gifts and services is distinguished from the capitalist system of
transferable credit by its preference for temporal imprecision, but
this is not the same thing as saying that credit relations in the gift
economy are "atemporal." Rather, temporal imprecision, along with
local specificity, was a measure of the extent to which a debt was also
conceived as generating and manifesting a relation of trust, or good
faith, between individuals and families. Conceptual inadequacies in
the common-law writ of debt, then (such as its denial of the rele-
vance of motive and intention to the question of whether or not a
debt exists between two people), are less likely to prove that social
actors had unsophisticated ideas about intention, or about promis-
sory duration, than that the sophistication of their ideas manifested
itself in spaces outside of the common law, such as in the spiritual
action of fidei iaesio or breach of faith, or in the regulatory power of
their concepts of trust and friendship, and of what Marshall Sahlins
has called "kinship distance."" Indeed, the absence from Wilson's
book of any vocabulary that would recognize the spiritual and moral
dimensions of promissory speech acts-the vocabulary of "faith,"
"trust," "troth," "troth-plight," and so forth-is quite remarkable.
There is nothing in this book to suggest that the "social actors" of
"customary" (that is, pre-assumpsit) culture had any emotional in-
vestment in the repayment or forgiveness of debts, in spite of the fact
that a whole penitential literature associated with the confessional
and with the ecclesiastical courts had, for centuries, articulated the
importance for salvation of the restitution of goods. In spite of this
curious omission, however, Wilson's book is clearly an achievement
10. ULRICH VON HUTTEN ET AL., EPISTOLAE OBSCURORUM VIRORUM (1517). This fa-
mous collection of anti-clerical satires, translated into English as Letters of Obscure Men, was
the collaborative work of Von Hutten (1488-1523) and several other leading German human-
ists.
11. MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE-AGE ECONOMICS 196-204 (Routledge 1988) (1972).
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of great originality and erudition. I am sure that its influence on ways
of thinking about agency, time, and character in Shakespearean
drama will be profound.
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